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# THE FUTURE of WARSAW

By FELIX MLYNARSKI, Ph. D.

Delegate of the Polish National Supreme Committee to America

REPRINT OF CHAPTER IV  
OF THE AUTHOR'S BOOK ON

## THE PROBLEMS of the COMING PEACE

NEW YORK

POLISH BOOK IMPORTING CO., Inc.

1916

# THE PROBLEMS of the COMING PEACE

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“The Problem of the Policy of State Independence”

(A Study in the Theory of Politics)

Lemberg, 1911, 211 pp.

“The Principles of Social Philosophy”

Vol. I (in print)

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CHAPTER IV.—THE FUTURE OF WARSAW

The map of Europe contains a great political paradox. This paradox is the line of the Vistula, which is one of the main rivers of central Europe. Its upper part is in the hands of Austria-Hungary; the middle part in the hands of Russia and the lower part in those of Germany. On the upper part of the Vistula lies the town of Cracow where the old Polish Kings are buried; in the middle part of the Vistula is Warsaw, the capital of Poland, while Danzig, the old Polish harbor town, lies at the mouth of the Vistula. It certainly is a paradox which shows geographically the political slavery of Poland. Cut in three parts, the Vistula is a river of slavery and the river of the great Polish suffering.

The paradox of the Vistula is the strategical and economical expression of what Clemenceau has called "one of the biggest crimes in history."\*

The present war has been called a war fought for the liberty of nations. Ten millions of troops have been rushed into the valley of the Vistula, and from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains there is one vast struggle going on, a struggle for which there is no comparison in history. The main issue in this enormous struggle is the fate of Warsaw, the capital of Poland. From the strategical point of view it is a question of the Vistula—from the political point of view it is a question of Poland's future. On the banks of the Vistula, justice is meted out for the partition of Poland and

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\* "L'Homme Libre," August 16, 1914.

the three powers, which once upon a time dismembered Poland, are finally facing each other as enemies, arrayed for a final settlement. The Polish question which hitherto united them began to be a bone of contention; under the pressure of military necessity, both sides were compelled to approach the Polish nation, which ages ago settled on the banks of the Vistula and occupies the theatre of the present war.

The time came for making promises.

The proclamation which a year ago the German and the Austro-Hungarian armies distributed in Russian-Poland stated that the armies of these countries were bringing "Liberty and Independence"\* to Poland. This was the first ray of hope for the Polish nation. A few days later another promise came, this time from the opposite party. On August 15, 1914, the late Russian Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolajevitch, proclaimed that the intention of Russia is to unite Poland under the sceptre of the Czar. "Poland shall be reborn under this sceptre, free in faith, in language, in self-government." The armies of the western nations gave the hope of independence—the armies of the eastern power have limited the future of Poland to autonomy. The aforesaid proclamations, however, were proclamations issued only by commanders-in-chief, and not by their respective governments.

Poland knew long ago that the war would practically draw closer, and she prepared herself so as not to be surprised and to have a plan of action. During the war in the Balkans, Poland advanced her preparations considerably. Old and new organizations began secretly or openly to work with fewer in order to be able, in case of a war between Austria and

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\* "Nowa Reforma," Cracow, August, 1914.

Russia, to form their own military representation and throw it in the game and fight for Poland's independence. Outwardly, Poland made her first political demonstration in European politics in the summer of 1913. Polish military organizations and independence parties sent a delegation to London, where at that time a conference of ambassadors of European nations was in session, and it deposited with Sir Edward Grey and all the ambassadors assembled in conference a memorandum on the question of Poland. This memorandum was nothing else but a program of Poland's attitude in the war which at that time was already anticipated. This memorandum called Europe's attention to the fact that in case of a war, Poland would throw her lot with Austria-Hungary against Russia because under present political conditions such an action means the only real road to independence for Poland. The moment when the anticipated war broke out Poland did not need to make her action dependent on any of the aforesaid proclamations which the armies of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia distributed all over Poland's territory.

On August 5, 1914, the first Polish patrol composed of members of Polish military organizations left Cracow and crossed Russia's frontier, headed for Kielce in Russian Poland. This patrol was followed by other detachments numbering several thousand of men. All of them were revolutionary troops trained in a military organization which for a good many years carried on the work openly in Galicia and under cover in Prussian and in Russian-Poland; in these organizations young men were trained for military purposes in order to be able to form, in case of war between Austria and Russia, a military representation of Poland. The plan elaborated long ago began to work. The frontier posts which for over a hundred years separated Cracow from

Warsaw were pulled down; they were pulled down by the Polish revolutionary soldiers who were the first to cross the frontier in order to bring liberty to Russian-Poland. This happened on August 5th—precisely fifty years after the Russian government in Warsaw, through the hangman's noose, executed the last five members of the last Polish National Government. This date of August 5th was a festival and the day of the beginning of a new fight for independence. At the head of the movement stood Joseph Piłsudski, a Russian subject. The road to Kielce was open for him because the Russian armies retreated for strategical reasons and the armies of Austria-Hungary had not arrived. Neither was there any proclamation from any of the warring powers. The action of the Poles outran the coming events. In Kielce, where for a while no other armies had made their appearance and which was occupied only by the Polish troops, the independence of Poland was proclaimed. The churches resounded with Polish national anthems for which hitherto Russian government deported the people to Siberia. Polish flags showing the historical White Eagle were once more floating over the city showing their white and crimson colors to the eyes of the enthusiastic people. The ranks of the Polish revolutionary army began to swell by a large number of volunteers who were able to escape the Russian orders of mobilization.

One must have gone through slavery himself in order to understand and appreciate the feelings of a nation throwing off the shackles of its slavery.

On August 3, 1914, proclamations of a secret National Government were posted in Warsaw which summoned the nation to rise against Russia and join hands with the detachments of the Polish revolutionary army which was coming up from the Galician frontier. A young Pole, a member



of the Polish conspiracy, was caught by a Russian police while posting the aforesaid bills, and on the next day a volley shot from the rifles of an executionary squad ended his life in the citadel of Warsaw. He was the first victim of the war. About two weeks later the proclamation of the Russian commander-in-chief was issued; in this proclamation, from fear of the awakening revolutionary spirit, a promise of autonomy was made to Poland. It was not enough for a nation that had older political traditions than Russia but, above everything else, the promise came too late. The action of the Poles not only came ahead of the armies of both sides but also of their promises. In Galicia all the political parties succeeded in uniting and in getting into communication with the secret National Government in Warsaw. Because of the freedom of action in Galicia the center of gravity of the entire movement was shifted from Warsaw to Cracow from where the first signal for the war of independence was issued. On the basis of an agreement between the secret and open political parties in Galicia and Russian-Poland, which form together two-thirds of the organized parties in Poland, the Supreme National Committee was organized in Cracow on August 16, 1914; this committee until now has the supreme sway over the destinies of the nation. It is a political representation of Poland in the present war and it is a nucleus of the Polish state, should the conscience of the world awake and should Poland gain her independence. All the detachments of the Polish revolutionary forces which were in garrison in Kielce, received the name of "Polish Legions" from the Supreme National Committee. Thus the actual force of the nation, elements organized openly or secretly, and based on an entirely democratic principle, declared themselves against Russia and formed an alliance with Austria-Hungary. The Russian

promises did not succeed in halting them nor did so the memories of the ill-treatment suffered by the Poles to a great extent at the hands of Prussia.

The policy of every nation must be a real one, that means it must be based on facts, on real conditions of work and not on fantastic dreams. Nobody has any right to condemn republican France for allying herself with despotic Russia, although French money subsidized the struggle of Russian reaction against the progressive movement. Nobody has the right to blame England for going hand in hand with Russia, although ten years ago England perfectly consciously defeated Russia by the Japanese in Eastern Asia. Nobody has the right to condemn Servia for allying herself with Turkey against Bulgaria in the second Balkan war, although grass has not grown as yet on the graves at Kumanowo and Lule Burgas. In the same way, nobody can condemn Poland for allying herself with Austria-Hungary and throwing her forces against Russia. Every nation has a "ratio status" of its own, which determines the direction of its policy. This "ratio status" is the result of historical traditions and of material conditions for action. Positive results can be reached only through positive means. The road to Berlin does not lead through the moon but along the strategical line of the Rhine or the Vistula. The road from Italy to Trentino leads through the Alps but not across the ocean. It is useless to vociferate against the Germans when the ammunition gives out on the road to Berlin. A certain purpose requires positive means and the reality of the means is determined by the facts and the conditions on the theatre of a war or of politics. The alliance of Poland with Austria-Hungary was the result of the Polish "ratio status" and of real conditions which already beforehand decided that only by an alliance with Austria-Hungary and by a war against Russia, Poland

can become free and independent. Whoever thinks that the decision of Poland was influenced by feelings, sympathies, promises or fantastic hope, is mistaken. Poland did not stop to compare the injuries she suffered from Prussia with those she suffered at Russia's hands. This would have been a childish policy or a policy of nervous artists. Not feelings but interest decided the issue. Poland does not fight nowadays because of a desire of revenge against Russia nor because of a desire of showing her gratitude to Austria-Hungary. The anti-Polish policy of Russia was real and sincere, but the Polish anti-Russian policy was in no degree less sincere and less real. Poland understands and respects the "ratio status" of other states and other nations, even that of Russia, but Poland puts on the same basis before the world her own "ratio status" and fights for its realization.

Arms do not terminate war although they decide battles. An army with its blood establishes facts but the conclusions from these premises are drawn by the diplomats when the peace treaties are negotiated. The Polish question is not going to be decided on the battlefield, although battles are decided on Polish grounds. The Polish question shall come up together with the whole mass of political questions during the coming peace congress regardless of the form which the latter shall have. This is the goal for which the Polish hopes are aimed, and the work done by the Polish Legions paves the way to this goal.

One hundred years ago the Congress of Vienna was in session. The Napoleonic hurricane came to an end and then diplomacy started bargaining. The Polish question was one of the foremost among the issues confronting the Congress. Who did revive the Polish question in Europe? Polish troops followed the eagles of Napoleon in his expedition against Russia in 1812. The Polish army was headed by

Prince Joseph Poniatowski. The Polish army commanded by him was the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw established by Napoleon in 1807 at the peace treaty of Tilsit. Poland has established right at the very beginning of the Napoleonic era a military representation on the side of France. Then appeared for the first time the idea of Polish Legions. By way of Italy, Egypt and even Santo Domingo in America the Polish legions began their march to Warsaw. The road was a long one and cost a heavy toll of blood, but finally it led the legions to their intended goal. The Polish legions were not animated only by hatred when combating Russia nor did they help France only because of any feeling of sympathy. There were feelings even very keen, strong and sacred feelings, but they were far from deciding the Polish policy. The decisive factor was the desire of creating a Polish military representation on the background of Napoleonic wars in order thus to create a representation for the Polish aspirations for freedom and in order to confront Europe with the Polish question. Liberty can be gained only by blood and iron and therefore the flag carried by the Polish legions of a hundred years ago was such a flag of blood and iron. The glory which fell upon this flag of the legions became the glory of the Polish nation, and it was because of the merit of these legions that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was established at the peace treaty of Tilsit.

Napoleon was defeated, and his defeat meant at the same time the military defeat of the Polish cause. The commander of the Polish army, Prince Joseph Poniatowski, a hero known very well to-day all over Europe and a field-marshal of Napoleon's army, was drowned in the River Elster while covering the retreat of Napoleon from Leipzig. The Polish cause, however, did not perish. In spite of the military defeat the Polish legions of the Napoleonic army

caused the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland with a separate parliament and a Polish army in Warsaw. The fact that the Polish army helped Napoleon against Russia and thus against England did not obscure the view of the Cabinet of London. England did not hesitate to support the Polish cause against Russia although Russia was an ally of England in the latter's life and death struggle against Napoleon. The attack which in the battle of Leipzig Prince Joseph Poniatowski led against the village of Probstheida occupied by Russian troops commanded by Emperor Alexander I himself, was therefore something more than a mere incident of this "battle of nations." By conquering Probstheida, Prince Joseph Poniatowski "was conquering the capital of the future Kingdom of Poland under the eyes of this Kingdom's future monarch."\* Prince Joseph Poniatowski perished and only remnants of the Polish regiments were left when the Napoleonic *épopée* came to an end. The blood and iron, however, have done their work: Polish regiments have compelled Europe to look at them as the representatives of the Polish state. Czar Alexander I had to yield to the opinion of Europe; and the Poles, although they lost militarily, they won, however, a political victory. They won the Kingdom of Poland which was supposed to be the nucleus for the future full reconstruction of Poland. Unfortunately, several years later Russia has broken the treaty of Vienna and abolished the constitution of the young state.

The example set by the Polish legions of a hundred years ago serves to-day as a guide for the Polish legions in the present war. The example of Prince Joseph Poniatowski is nowadays the guide of Piłsudski in the present war. Regardless of the military result the fact will remain on the records of history that in the great European war

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\* S. Askenazy: "Książę Józef Poniatowski," 1913, page 292.

Poland created her own military representation to remind the world of the fact of her bloody and heroic existence to force the world to face the question of Polish independence. The future Congress will decide the issue, but the blood of the Polish legions will be the seed of liberty when finally the conscience of the world will awake and "one of the biggest crimes in history will have an end."\* This is the basis of the Polish "ratio status" in the period of Poland's subjugation. Nobody had the right to demand that Poland should act against this "ratio status" of hers nor that it should follow the inspiration of the moment or believe in and wait for the fulfilment of somebody's promises. Poland exists between the hammer and the anvil, and every other nation would take the same course that Poland did, and the same course that the Polish legions took in the present war. This road agrees with the Polish traditions against Russia and with the Polish alliance with Austria-Hungary. The reason for this is a very simple and a very real one: the creating of a military representation was impossible in any other way. The first year of the European war has proved this contention by the force of facts. The attempt of Russia to organize a Polish legion in Warsaw against Austria-Hungary and Germany failed sadly and there is no Polish legion siding with Russia. On the other hand, the Polish legions against Russia and in alliance with Austria-Hungary are developing fast and have reached already the figure of many thousands of men. The evacuation of Warsaw increased the numerical strength of the Polish legions considerably. So the actual facts proved which side showed more possibility and actual opportunity: the decision proved to be a practical one against Russia and for an alliance with Austria-Hungary.

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\* Clemenceau, l. c.

Poland is not a free country. Every male citizen in Poland is compelled to serve in either the Russian or the German or the Austro-Hungarian army. The outbreak of the war came as suddenly as a thunder-bolt from a clear sky. The mobilization in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary took about a million men away from Poland within twenty-four hours. The rest of able-bodied Polish men were confronted by the possibility of being called to the colors as the war continued. To-day we can safely say that after the first year of the war is over there remained in Poland only women, children and old people. How could an army be formed under such conditions? The best judgment and the greatest sympathies cannot possibly raise an army when men are lacking. Recruiting cannot be done on the moon nor can officers be made over night and the question of an army is not a question of improvising one. The mobilization of the Polish Legions therefore on the background of the mobilization in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary could only be conducted on the basis of the logic of actual conditions and not on the basis of feelings, of sympathies or dispositions. The territory in which the recruiting for Polish Legions was possible was the left bank of the Vistula in the Kingdom of Poland. Galicia and Posen could not furnish an adequate supply of recruits because they form together only 20 per cent. of the historical territory of Poland, and besides the mobilization of Austria-Hungary and of Germany goes quicker than the mobilization of Russia. This is the first fact of great importance, because owing to this fact the Russian mobilization was compelled to leave against its very intentions a large material of men for purpose of Polish policy. It was of no less importance that the Russian mobilization is less exact, that it proceeds more slowly, and that

Russia possesses 80 per cent. of the Polish historical territory and the old Polish capital of Warsaw. Those were the real conditions which regardless of the sympathies or the antipathies decided beforehand that by waging war against Russia only on the territory of Russian-Poland could the recruiting for the Polish Legions have any chance of success.

The map will show that the frontiers of Russian-Poland are flanked on the north by the Prussian frontier and on the south by the frontier of Galicia. In case of war there was a danger for the Russian armies in Russian-Poland that Austria-Hungary and Germany, which have a speedier mobilization, would by a flank attack from the north and from the south, cut them off on the Vistula and destroy them before the reserves from the interior of Russia would be able to reach the theatre of war. Russia was made aware of this danger long ago by some of her best generals such as Dragomirow, Hurko and even Kuropatkin. According to their judgment Russia had to evacuate in the first few weeks of the war the left bank of the Vistula for strategical reasons so that the reserves coming up from the interior of Russia would have a shorter road for getting to the battle line and thus be able to reach the seat of war before the armies of the enemy would be able to move forward from the north and from the south. This was known both in Poland and in Western Europe. France was afraid of this possibility as France was compelled to depend on a speedy offensive movement of Russia in the direction of Berlin and on this plan were based the hopes of France to protect Paris from a violent onrush of the German armies. This was a decisive fact for Poland. The evacuation of the western provinces of Russian-Poland by the Russians meant in case of the outbreak of the war the stopping of the



Russian mobilization in these districts. The western districts of Russian-Poland are chiefly industrial. Here are to be found large coal mines in the valley of Dąbrowa and of Sosnowiec, and besides there is a number of industrial centres such as Częstochowa or Nowo-Radomsk. The outbreak of the war closed the factories and the mines: the masses of laboring men were thrown out of employment, and as Russia had to retreat there was left for the Polish legions ready and very useful material of men. Thus the Polish legions recruited the majority of their soldiers from these sections of the country. Eighty per cent. of the soldiers in the Polish Legions were recruited in Russian-Poland and the majority among them came from the industrial districts which Russia had to evacuate in the beginning of the war temporarily for strategical reasons. This was an anticipated fact but still it played a decisive part in the Polish policy. The mobilization of Poland had to be necessarily directed against Russia if it was to be of any use and if it was to give results.

The rest of the task of organization rested with Galicia which for over half a century enjoyed the benefits of autonomy within the general constitution of Austria-Hungary. "Galicia has not been unhappy."\* In Posen there are no Polish schools nor Polish university: in Russian-Poland there was a university, but a Russian one, and all schools were Russian too while private schools suffered from exceedingly heavy restrictions on the part of the Russian Government. In Posen, the Commission of Colonization originated by Bismarck bought up Polish land and settled it with Germans. In Russian-Poland the "Bank włościański" has done the same for over fifty years and colonizes Polish

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\* "The Germans," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 12.

land with Orthodox Russian peasants. In Lithuania and Little Russia the Poles are absolutely forbidden to buy land nor to sell to anyone except a Russian. Thus a Pole cannot acquire land which actually belongs to the Poles, neither in Lithuania or in Little Russia. Czar Nicholas I invented the system of destroying the Polish nation and Bismarck became his apt pupil. This was done very much to the disadvantage of Russia and of Germany and brought great harm to Poland. The development of the Polish nation thus remained under the most trying conditions, whereby great mistakes were committed in Petrograd with regard to the Polish question and still greater ones were committed by Berlin. The friendship between Germany and Russia was the basis for oppressing Poland. The celebration of the 500th anniversary of the victory of Grunwald, where the combined forces of Poland and Lithuania annihilated the power of the Teutonic Knights, could not be celebrated in Warsaw but only in Cracow in spite of the fact that not Russia but Austria-Hungary was in alliance with Germany. The monument of the victory over the Germans could be erected, and in fact still stands in Cracow but could not possibly stand in Warsaw. This is enough said to the initiated. It is a basis for understanding the policy of Poland in the present war. Owing to her autonomous freedom Galicia was able to become the territory on which the preparations for the future war of independence could be carried on. The best material of men from Russian-Poland took refuge in Galicia where these elements could be instructed militarily in special Polish military organizations. Thus Galicia educated the officers for the present Polish legions and only Galicia was able to do it. The first detachments of the Polish Legions which crossed the Russian frontier north of Cracow were skeleton detach-

ments composed only of officers and under-officers. On the left bank of the Vistula there were waiting for them the Polish recruits who were spared by the Russian mobilization and only too anxious to fight for their own sacred cause of independence.

This, however, was an old program and not a new one by any means.

In the years 1876-1878 when there was a danger of a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia on account of the Balkan situation all the political parties of Poland united in order to prepare a new revolution against Russia in alliance with Austria-Hungary. For this purpose a "Confederation of the Polish Nation" was formed which played the part of a political representation of the nation. The movement was headed by Prince Sapieha who was assisted by Rev. Albin Dunajewski who subsequently was Bishop of Cracow and Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. In those times England was on terms of friendship with Germany and protected Constantinople from the appetite of Russia. Thus England worked behind the stage in organizing a Polish revolution against Russia. The plan of the revolution consisted of marching armed and well organized detachments of revolutionary armies into Russian-Poland from Galicia: these detachments were intended to be the nucleus of the future Polish army. Russian-Poland was expected to furnish the men and Galicia the officers. The English Government was well informed of the entire plan and even promised to help quietly by furnishing arms and money. Cardinal Manning, who was famous all over England took part in a secret meeting of Polish politicians in Vienna: at this meeting important decisions were taken in case the war should really break out. There was no war, however, but the Congress of Berlin completed the diplo-

matic defeat of Russia. A tradition was left behind in Poland, however, to that effect that England has understood the Polish "ratio status" which prompted the Poles to avail themselves of their liberties in Galicia in order to prepare a revolution in Russian-Poland. For forty years ever since the Congress of Berlin, Poland did not discontinue her policy and constantly instructed young men in secret and in open organizations of military nature. Poland's policy was not altered by the fact that Austria-Hungary entered into an alliance with Germany which has lasted for over thirty years and furnished ample time to reconsider the matter: Poland's policy was not altered even when Prussia began a systematic oppression in Posen and England failed to protest against such treatment of the Poles. Just at this particular time England ceded Heligoland which became the basis for Germany's naval power. Several years later England preferred to threaten France with war on account of the Fashoda incident than to intervene at Berlin for the protection of the Poles although the oppression of the Poles in Posen by Prussia violated the treaty of Vienna of 1815. Bismarck was not fond of the sea and Poland is not Belgium and Warsaw does not face London. Poland felt bitterly over being abandoned to her fate by Western Europe, but she did not deter her from following her anti-Russian policy.

When after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 by Austria-Hungary, the danger of war became imminent to Poland, new organizations were added to those which existed since the time of the Congress of Berlin and preparations were going on feverishly. The Polish "ratio status" did not change at all since the time when Cardinal Manning conferred in Vienna with representatives of Poland on the details of a revolution against Russia. To-day Eng-

land is militarily allied with Russia: the English tactics changed, but the conditions in Poland did not. Cardinal Dunajewski is also dead, but another dignitary of the Roman Catholic Church, Bishop Bandurski, is a member of the Supreme National Committee. The only change that has occurred is that Poland's sufferings became greater and deeper. Should this be the reason why England no longer understands the Polish "ratio status," although England has understood it and recognized it forty years ago under analogous conditions for Poland?

Poland has been and is still in a most precarious position. She could not do anything else but fight against Russia, and in order to do this she had to draw her recruits from Russian-Poland and her supply of officers from Galicia. This was not prompted by feelings but by actual conditions of things. Not because of blind hatred but because of absolute necessity was Poland compelled to direct her main attacks against Russia. Warsaw the Capital of Poland and besides eighty per cent. of Poland's territory was in Russia's hands or in other words, Russia held the trunk of Poland's body. It is therefore quite natural that the Polish attack had to be directed against Russia.

On October 2, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Government drafted a diplomatic note addressed to all neutral countries in which the said government officially recognized the Polish Legions as combatants. This important document ended as follows:

"Any action on the part of Russia which would imply a refusal to recognize the Polish Legions as a combatant party would constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions of the Convention of The Hague and against which the Government of Austria-Hungary already now files a most categorical protest."

This note was published by the "Fremdenblatt" of Vienna, which is the official organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus the Polish military representation obtained an official sanction. The Polish soldier became a political factor in Europe because the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government secured for him the protection of international law. The future peace congress has therefore a perfect freedom of action with regard to the Polish question. When some time in the future the hostilities will be suspended this moment will find the Polish Legions in the field. Regardless of the military result of the war this is going to be a fact which from the former point of view will greatly facilitate the reviving of the Polish question at the time of the coming peace congress. According to international law Poland is only a combatant party but is not a belligerent one because there is only a Polish nation and no Polish state. Hitherto only a Polish military representation is recognized in the world-war; nevertheless, the Polish Legions can constitute a material as well as a formal point of departure for the initiative in the Polish question when the future peace congress will meet. Poland hopes that the conscience of the world will awake and that historical justice is going to be done. Poland did everything on her part to organize a military representation of her own, and it is now Europe's turn to bring about the happiness of humanity and the freedom of nations when this awful war will come to an end.

The note of Austria-Hungary with regard to the Polish Legions has greatly alarmed Russia. Petrograd decided therefore at once upon an attempt of organizing in Warsaw of Polish Legions for the purpose of combating against the Germans. It was an intrigue intended for provoking a voluntary fight between the Poles themselves and thus killing

the Polish question from the international point of view. Organizing two military representations is absurd. The danger for Poland was great and because of unemployment, famine and particularly because of the mistakes made by the policy of Prussia with regard to Poland in the times preceding the war it was comparatively easy for Russia to mislead individuals. Poland is an oppressed country, without a government after all, and therefore every individual has a free hand to act as he pleases. Oppression has accustomed the nation to the principle of "*liberum censeo*," which principle permits every individual to consider himself as his own governor. The level of political enlightenment of the masses is not equal in all parts of Poland, where, by the way, the schools are in other hands than those of the Poles and where a general oppression prevails. Russia therefore determined to destroy what the legions of Cracow have accomplished politically. In November, 1914, that means about four months after the Polish Legions have crossed the Russian frontier, Czar Nicholas II has commissioned his Chamberlain, Count Wielopolski, to organize in Warsaw a Polish National Committee as a competition to the Supreme National Committee of Cracow. The right hand and in fact the brain of Count Wielopolski's action was a confidential man of the Russian Government, a former member of the Duma, Roman Dmowski. A portion of the Polish nobility and of the moneyed bourgeoisie supported this movement.

During all revolutions there were loyal parties, which distrusted the sword and were apt to believe in deceitful promises. The French Revolution had its loyalists and so had it American revolution in times of Washington.

The first utterance of the Committee of Warsaw was the proclamation of November 25, 1914, in which a protest was

made against the Supreme National Committee: the authors of this proclamation, however, did not have the courage of denying the fact that Austria-Hungary was "the only state in which our national rights had met with a measure of recognition."\* The autonomy of Galicia has been in force for over half a century, while the autonomy under Russian sovereignty was hitherto only a promise of the commander-in-chief. Under such conditions and because of a number of other practical considerations which were explained above, the Committee of Warsaw was necessarily without real backing among the Poles. All democratic parties refused to support the Committee in question: the latter tried to gain in importance by co-operating with the Committee of the Polish members of the Russian Duma in Petrograd. Russian-Poland used to elect to the Russian Duma only fourteen deputies out of a population of 12,000,000. Besides, the election law was of the most reactionary nature and deprived the masses of the people of any influence whatsoever. For these reasons the Poles boycotted the Russian Duma since the reactionary times of Stołypin and only the nobility and certain elements of the moneyed bourgeoisie took part in the election. This condition of things was correctly estimated by the London "Times," which, after the outbreak of the war and after the declaration of loyalty on the part of the Polish members of the Duma, has questioned the political value of their move because "chosen on the franchise and in the conditions which exist," they cannot "speak for the whole people."† The London "Times" is a newspaper of high standing and therefore had its doubts, which by the way were quite justified, whether the Polish

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\* "Poland, Russia and the War," by Alma Tadema, London, 1914, page 21.

† The "Times," London, August 17, 1914.



nation will be able "to forget 1830 and 1863?" Reality has soon manifested itself in spite of the artificial propaganda made by the press. The Committee of Warsaw supported the Russian plan of organizing a Polish Legion on Russia's side. A most spirited propaganda was carried on for three months and failed completely. The nation did not back up the action, and no army can be raised on paper nor by spilling streams of ink and making a propaganda. Several hundred of misled volunteers were quietly incorporated into the Russian army: thus the entire undertaking failed politically. The Russian intrigue came to a naught and the moral standing as well as the numerical strength of the Polish Legions organized in Cracow was increased considerably.

The reasons for Russia's failure in Warsaw were very grave ones. Russia promised autonomy to Poland but she did not promise independence. While the war that is waged at the present time is conducted for the sake of the liberty of nations Russia only offered autonomy which by the way was only administrative and not legislative. To the Poles it meant only uniting under one yoke instead of under three which was far from being a program of independence. All illusions were swept away by the *Corriere della Sera* of Milano which stated that the Czar has purposely failed to sign the proclamation with regard to the Polish cause.\* The "*Gołos Moskwy*" confirmed this by betraying the fact that the manifesto of Grand Duke Nicholas was not backed up at all by the Russian Government and that this was merely a tactical move which was required from Russia by General Joffre. The attitude of the Russian Government during the war gave conclusively justified the suspicions of Poland since Russia did not cease for one moment to exterminate all aspirations for Polish independence. The

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\* "For a Lasting Peace," Paris, 1915, page 23.

Russian Government has forbidden to put the White Eagle, which is the national emblem of Poland, on the flags of the Legion that Russia attempted to organize in Warsaw, and even Polish national anthems were sternly prohibited by the police.\* While this was going on the Russian Government abolished autonomy in Eastern Galicia which was then occupied by the Russian armies and began to proceed with the russification of this province.

Eastern Galicia never formed a part of Russia and belonged to Poland ever since 1340. From the ethnographical point of view it has a mixed population the majority of which is Ruthenian in the eastern district of the said province. This, however, does not justify at all Russian imperialism. The Ruthenians and the Russians have just as much in common as the Belgian Walons have with France or the Belgian Flamands with Holland. Does this entitle France or Holland to annex Belgium? The imperialism of Russia, however, did not possess any nationalistic scruples in spite of the fact that international law does not permit a legal annexation of an occupied territory. Count Bobrinski, the Russian Governor of Eastern Galicia, declared right upon his arrival in Lemberg that he "shall introduce here the Russian language, Russian law, the Russian state administration," and that "the Polish Diet shall not be convoked."† In consequence thereof the Polish university as well as all educational institutions, both Polish and Ruthenian, were closed at once. Every possible autonomy has been abolished at once and instead the Russian despotic and anti-democratic system of government was introduced. Tshichatshef, who advocated the separation of the province of Kholm from Russian-Poland, in the Russian

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\* "Nowa Gazeta," Warsaw, November 11, 1914.

† "For a Lasting Peace," page 23.

Duma has with a knowledge of the Russian Government outlined a plan for colonizing Galicia with Russian Orthodox peasants.\* Only the defeat of the Russian armies and the liberation of Lemberg has saved Galicia from the activity of the Russian "Bank włościanski" which distinguishes itself from the Prussian Commission of Colonization only by the fact of being older. Besides religious tolerance was abolished and the Greek Orthodox religion was introduced forcibly. The Greek Catholic Church which for centuries was united with the Roman Church was slated as a victim. And Russia attempted to introduce religious persecution into Eastern Galicia after having already made a bloody debut of a similar action in the province of Kholm, in Lithuania and in the Ukraina. History, however, has already passed a sentence on this action of Russia by saying as follows: "In Poland's ancient provinces, inhabited by the united Greeks, the government obliged the people to sign addresses to the Czar, asking him for the restoration of the Orthodox religion. Those who refused to sign were put into prison or deported.† The culminating point of the Russian method of converting to the Orthodox religion, was the year 1875. In Kroże few volleys had been fired into praying crowds of Greek Catholic worshippers, and in other parts of Russian-Poland thousands of people were deported to Siberia, and thus the Greek Catholic Church has been destroyed in Eastern Poland. At once after the temporary occupation of Lemberg by the Russian armies the Russian Bishop Eulogius came on a similar mission to Eastern Galicia. His action has soon manifested itself. The "Russkij Inwalid" published in January, 1915, the news that Bishop Eulogius had submitted to the Holy Synod in Petro-

\* "Nowoje Wremia," Petrograd, April 15, 1915.

† M. Seignobos: "Contemporary History," 1910, page 422.

grad a report in which he insisted upon "abolishing in Galicia of the spiritual Greek Catholic hierarchy because the Russian law does not recognize the Greek Catholic Church."\*

*Sapienti sat.*

"Slavic brotherhood and liberating the Poles from Prussian oppression" proved in practice to be nothing else but introducing of Russian oppression into autonomous Galicia which was the last refuge of free Polish thought. The zeal of Russia in this direction unfortunately proved to be a universal one. No voice of protest was raised by anybody in Russia and once more voices became loud suggesting the exclusion of the Polish question from the questions to be decided by the future peace congress. The Russian reactionary party as well as the progressive party joined hands in order to prevent the Polish question to become something else than "an internal problem of Slavdom," which in practice meant nothing else but an internal problem of the Russian Government. It is useless to speak about the reactionary party because its feelings toward Poland were only too well known. It was more painful that even Briantshaninov, a truly liberal Russian politician agreed with the reactionary party that "Europe should under no circumstances take any part in the settlement of the mutual relations between Russia and Poland."† The progressive "Utro Rossiji" went still further, and considered the suggestions of turning over the Polish question for settlement to England, France and Russia, even with exclusion of Austria-Hungary and Germany, as "illegal and criminal," because the organization of future Poland "does not of right

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\* "Goniec." Warsaw, January 17, 1915.

† "Kurjer poranny," Warsaw, March 11, 1915.

rest with any congresses at all."\* Anybody, however, who would suggest that the fate of Poland should not depend upon the mercy of the victor was threatened with deportation to Siberia.

Independence can either be an absolute one or can acquire the form of a state within a state, as such is the case with Hungary or with Bavaria. Russia is opposed to such either form of independence as far as Poland is concerned. Russia is afraid of an absolute independence of Poland because such an independence of Poland would keep Russia away from Central Europe and would stop Russia's pressure on the road leading through Vienna to Constantinople. Russia is furthermore afraid of Poland as a state within the state under the domination of Russia because the freedom of Poland could turn out to be contagious for Russia herself and particularly for Finland and the Caucasus. The freedom of Poland is a danger to reactionary government and to despotism. The fear of progress prompted Russia to promise Poland in the present war nothing else but autonomy, administrative and not legislative at that.

The Russian plan with regard to Poland created an impression in Western Europe and particularly in America, because it has promised the uniting of the entire Poland under the sceptre of the Czar. The Russian plan has thus promised one yoke instead of three and has thus apparently simplified matters. All these beautiful phrases, however, concealed a truly Byzantinic perfidy. Poland has ethnographical as well as political boundaries: the first ones are boundaries of actual settlement while the other ones are boundaries of the Polish State which has ceased to exist. Russia decided to apply to the eastern portion of Poland the ethnographical principle and to the western portion of

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\* "Goniec wieczorny," Warsaw, January 7, 1915.

Poland the historical principle. Acting on this basis Russia has separated before the war the province of Kholm from Russian-Poland, and during the war, Eastern Galicia from Austrian-Poland, whereby she assumed the point of view that the territory settled by the Ruthenians in Galicia reaches as far as the upper course of the Dunajec. In contradiction with the historical fact that neither the province of Kholm nor Eastern Galicia have ever formed a part of the Russian State, and in contradiction with the ethnographical fact that the Ruthenians are not Russians, Russia considered the province of Kholm and Galicia as far as the course of the upper Dunajec as Russian territory and endeavored to eliminate them from Polish influence. This meant nothing else but cutting slices away from Poland in the east promising at the same time to extend the boundaries in the west. For Kholm, Lemberg, Przemyśl, and Nowy Sącz Russia promised to Poland, Cracow, Silesia, Posen, Danzig, and Koenigsburg. Cracow used to be the crowning place of the Polish Kings, Posen was the cradle of Poland, Danzig was Poland's harbor on the Baltic Sea, Silesia fell apart from Poland even before the end of the Middle Ages and was not a part of Poland at the time of Poland's partitions, while Koenigsburg was the capital of a feudal principality of Poland and not the capital of a Polish province. Koenigsburg was the capital of East Prussia which was built up in the Middle Ages by the Teutonic Knights during their wars against Slav tribes. The program of Russia in the west agreed, therefore, with the historical traditions of Poland and not with the ethnographical considerations. This program apparently flattered the Polish national pride but in outlining this program Russia was prompted by different and very selfish reasons. The boundaries of historical Poland agree with the boundaries needed

by Russian strategical considerations on Russia's western frontier. These considerations form the question of the Vistula line of defence. The uniting of Polish territories under the sceptre of the Czar would solve very advantageously for Russia the paradox of the Vistula, which before the war passed through three different states. By uniting Poland the Vistula would become an internal river of the Russian Empire and the frontier would move west as far as the upper Oder. In the first year of this war the Russian press has on different occasions stated quite plainly that strategical considerations are pushing Russia as far west as Frankfort on the Oder.

The forcible pushing of the frontier of future Poland in the westerly direction, and at the same time cutting off the genuine Polish soil in its eastern part, raises the relative per cent. of the German element in Poland to the disadvantage of the native element. Eastern Prussia is inhabited by 2,064,175 people, but there are only 16 per cent. of Poles. Eastern Prussia never was a Polish province, but only a principality held in feudal tenure. In Western Prussia the population numbers 1,703,477, but the per cent. of Poles is 35, especially so on both banks of the Vistula River which used to be a road to the sea at the time of the Polish kingdom. The Province of Posen, the cradle of the Polish state, has 2,099,831 people, and in this number there are only 765,000 Germans. The lower, middle and upper Silesias are inhabited by 5,225,962 people. Poles inhabit mostly upper Silesia, their number being 1,158,789. All of these provinces constitute the so-called Prussian part of former Poland, lost by Poland at the time of her partition, or before it, as it was the case with Silesia and Eastern Prussia. The Polish population on this entire area numbers 3,646,446. The German population in both Eastern and Western Prussia is

2,922,699; in the Province of Posen, 765,000; in Silesia 4,067,173, totaling 7,754,822. Consequently there are here twice as many Germans as Poles.\* The cause of this preponderance of German element is the fact that Silesia and Eastern Prussia were undergoing a process of Germanization still in the Middle Ages, and they did not belong to Poland at the time of her partition. The Russian plans to make the Vistula an internal river of the Russian empire endangers the Polish ethnographical interests, since they introduce too large a percentage of Germans into the Polish organism.

When the ethnographical data of Russian-Poland, Western Galicia and of Prussian-Poland, which provinces Russia promised to reunite, are compared, the danger becomes very evident. The population of Russian-Poland is 12,467,300, of which Poles number 9,115,220; Germans, 618,590; Jews, 1,660,490. The population of Galicia is 8,025,675, Poles claim 4,000,000, Ruthenians 3,674,000 and Germans 212,000. Russia intends to annex Eastern Galicia up to the line of the lower San, lower Wislock, and upper Dunajec. In other words, for the "United Poland" there would be left only two "governments," that of Cracow and that of Tarnow. In doing this Russia separates ethnographically about 2,500,000 Poles in the middle, and Eastern Galicia and leaves them a prey to russification. This plan allows "United Poland" only 1,500,000 Poles out of Galicia. The ethnographical aspect of Poland thus "United" would be as follows:

Russian-Poland . . . . .	9,115,220 Poles
Western Galicia . . . . .	1,500,000 "
Polish provinces retaken from	
Prussia . . . . .	3,646,446 "
Total . . . . .	14,261,666 Poles

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\* According to "The New International Yearbook," New York, 1914, and according to Polish statistics.



The number of Germans on the same area would be :

(1) In the parts retaken from Prussia, 7,754,822 people—  
if Silesia and Eastern Prussia would also be united with  
Poland.

(2) In Russian-Poland, together with the Jews, 2,279,080.

(3) In Western Galicia 212,000, and together with those  
Jews who do not claim to be Poles, about 500,000.

The total number of Germans and Jews in Poland "Re-  
united," according to the Russian prescription, would be  
10,533,902.

It is plain now that such a plan only furthers German  
interests if the historical frontiers of Poland are extended  
in the westerly direction, while at the same time its eastern  
possessions are separated from it. The Jewish jargon is  
only a corrupted German, and the Jews were always in  
middle Europe, and especially in Poland, the vanguard of  
Teutonism. In defining the boundaries of Poland, and using  
the ethnographical key in the east, and the historical key in  
the west, Russia would create an ethnographical paradox, a  
state with a mixed population, where sooner or later a serious  
internal strife would be bound to arise. That is what Russia  
is aiming at, since then the Russian government would play  
the part of a peacemaker. The national strifes would render  
the normal development of the autonomy impossible, and  
would soon enable Russia to retake the power to Petrograd.  
The life of the promised autonomy would be a short one and  
the triumph of despotism early.

It is hard to assume that Europe would permit of the  
strategical occupation by Russia of the upper Oder River.  
Practically this is the only plan of occupation of the upper  
Silesia and perhaps of small parts of the middle and lower  
Silesia. Under these circumstances the number of Germans  
within the boundaries of Poland "United" by Russians

would be lower, but the ratio would be at any rate that of eight Germans and Jews, to fourteen Poles. This is entirely too large a ratio to reflect favorably on the internal conditions of the future state. The Germans constitute a rich, capable and aggressive element. The Jews are by no means inferior to them as far as aggressiveness is concerned, and they represented always, with their culture and language, the vanguard of Germanism in middle Europe. Both of them possess enormous financial resources, which they would throw upon Poland, devastated by war, in order to buy out the land and seize the industry with the help of foreign money. Russia never hesitated in her internal affairs to employ the Germans against the Poles, and still less would she hesitate to use them for the annihilation of autonomy of Poland "United," under the Czar's sceptre. A terrifying picture for Poland! It is by no means an empty phrase that the Jewish jargon is only corrupted German, and that the Jews were and still are, in middle Europe, the vanguard of Germanism. Jewish journalists frequently stated that the Jewish jargon "belongs to the great family of German languages, and that the Jews, despite the 500 years spent in the Slavic environment, preserved the German language, and even to-day belong to the German cultural stock."\* As a consequence many of the Jewish leaders, who, up to the time of expulsion of Russians from Galicia, wooed Russia, now look up to the favors of victorious Berlin that it may support Jews against Poles, since the Jews form in Poland a "German cultural island."

There was a sly reservation in the manifesto in which Nicolai Nikolayevitsh promised Poland reunion and autonomy under the sceptre of the Czar—"There is but one thing

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\* *Sonntagsblatt der "New Yorker Staatszeitung,"* 18, 7, 1915. "Die osteuropäische Judenfrage und der Krieg," by Dr. Malamed.

that Russia expects from you, that you respect the rights of those nationalities with which history has bound you." This was an attempt to check-mate the future of Poland with the Jewish question. The Jewish press of the whole world, basing itself on the above manifesto, started to demand equal national rights for Jews in Poland. Russia is known all over for her antisemitic feelings. Up to the latter days of this war, the Jews were not permitted to settle in Russia proper. The area permitted for Jewish settlement is more or less coincident with the area of the former Kingdom of Poland. The center of gravity of the Jewish question was by means of terrorism and pogroms transferred toward the Vistula. As the result of this partial policy of Petrograd, the percentage of Jews on Polish soil rose to a higher degree than anywhere else. In Russian-Poland the Jews constitute 13.71 per cent. of the 12,464,300 total population. In Lithuania and Polish-Ruthenia the percentage is somewhat higher. It is an artificial result of the antisemitic policy of the Russian government which routs the Jews from Russia proper and takes "fatherly" care of them in Poland. The manifesto of Prince Nikolai struck the same note, although it enveloped it discreetly with an appeal to justice.

The public opinion in Russia saw through it at once. Prince E. Trubeckoi, a recognized authority in Russian political life, published an address in which he expressed his satisfaction and hope that Russia, after the victory, will be able to solve two of her most vexing problems, namely, the Polish and Jewish question.\* And Milukoff, the leader of the Liberals in Russia, pointed out very clearly the parallelism of both questions in his daring statement that "the country across the Vistula is not exclusively inhabited by Poles, but that there exists another nationality, the Jews, who have

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\* "Russkoje Wiedomosti," 10, 31, 1914.

a right to be considered as a separate people, though being in the minority.”\* The same Russia which could not afford to grant equal civic rights to the Jews wants future Poland to grant them more, namely, the recognition of separate national rights, which Jews do not possess anywhere else in Western Europe, and in America. Both the philosemitic progressive party and the antisemitic reactionary party joined hands in order to sustain the former Russian policy toward the Jews, the policy which can only bring detriment to Poland. Instead of abolishing the boundary of Jewish settlement in the east, and granting the Jews equal civic rights, Russia wants to expand the area of their settlement to the west in order to create artificially with the aid of Jews and Germans national strife on the Vistula, and be able to abolish under this pretext the promised autonomy. Russia wants to create Judeo-Poland and thus facilitate the final russification and destruction of Poland.

In their attitude toward the Polish question, the Jews joined hands with Russia. “The Jewish press in the Polish provinces welcomed the Polish manifesto with almost hysterical enthusiasm.” The Jewish dailies in Warsaw said editorially that the Jews “are deeply grateful to the Russian commander-in-chief because in his manifesto to the Poles he did not forget to mention the other nationalities whose fate is bound up with that of the Poles,” and it is to be expected “that, in accordance with the manifesto, the Poles will respect the rights of the other nationalities within their provinces.”† Even in America, which was the centre of the anti-Russian-Jewish activity, a definite change can be observed. The same Jewish press, which a few years ago tried to influence the government to break off the commercial

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\* “The Globe,” New York, March 1, 1915.

† “The Day,” February 18, 1915.

treaties with Russia, is now elated by "Purishkewitsh, the Black Hundred Leader in the Duma, having kissed the scroll of Torah."\* They started in this war a general white-washing of Russia and a simultaneous slandering of Poland, intimating that "the pogrom policy *abandoned* by the Russian government was taken up in another form by the Poles!"† A whole machinery of slander and impudent lies was set in motion so as to finish up the unfortunate nation visited by all the calamities of the present war.

With lies, however, one cannot go far.

The note of the Jewish Bund proved beyond doubt that there were never any pogroms in Poland arranged by Poles. In December, 1914, Mr. Herman Bernstein publicly announced that "the Poles resolved to methods of barbarism in their policy of Jew-hatred—their hands are smeared with the blood of the Jews in Poland; a nation of pogrom-makers is unworthy of independence."‡ About a year afterward, when the same Mr. Bernstein returned from Europe, he ceased to speak about the "Polish pogroms," and at the first interview when landing on the continent attested that "for their military defeat on the battlefield, the Russian authorities made military pogroms against their own peaceful Jewish population."§ The main argument that Poles instigated Russian soldiers to the pogroms is puerile and ludicrous. Russia having in her record Kishenieff, Siedlce and Bialystok does not need any instigation. In spite of that, the Jewish press does not stop flirting with Puriskewitsh, although the latter is a deputy from Kishenieff, and endeavors to direct public opinion against the independence of Poland.

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\* "New York Sun," and "The Day," 2, 18, 1915.

† l. c., Bernstein Herman.

‡ "The Day," December 13, 1914.

§ "The New York Times," October 18, 1915.

These are the facts which show plainly that the Jews aid the Russian project of solving the Polish question and try to subdue the independence of Poland. The Jews themselves do not believe in any change in Russia, and that is the reason why they would gladly welcome the expansion of their settlement in the westerly direction in Poland, remaining at the same time in connection with Russia. In the internal politics they would be certain of the German aid, because in Poland the Jews are always the vanguard of Germanism. As far as commerce is concerned, they calculate on the capture of the eastern markets in Asia. In the wake of the Russian sword, if the latter were capable of opening the gates of Constantinople, Jewish money would pour into China and India where it would displace the capital of the Western European nations and pave the way for the Russian army. Thus the Russian imperialism and the Jewish commercial expansion were brought close together in the present war.

Poland was always friendly to Jews, especially the democratic, aspiring Poland. In the insurrection of 1863 the Jew, Wohl, was the treasurer of the national government, and the banker, Kronenberg, was one of the important personages. Before the very outbreak of the uprising, when the Russian soldiers were shooting at the Polish church procession on the streets of Warsaw as it emerged from the cathedral of St. John, the cross which fell from the hands of a Pole shot dead by a Russian soldier was picked up by a Jew and the demonstration was led by a Jew. It was only due to Russian influence that the friendly relations between Poles and Jews were brought to an end. Russophilism and antisemitism in Poland are but two aspects of the same thing. Roman Dmowski, who in the present war was the main-spring of the Russophilic committee, was, before the war, the leader of the antisemitic movement. The attitude of the

Jews toward the Polish cause proved to be identical with that of the Russophilic antisemites in Warsaw. Democratic Poland fighting for her liberty is just as Anti-Russian as it is not, and never was, antisemitic. This question has been sifted during the present war by Prof. Dr. W. L. Jaworski, the president of the Polish Supreme National Committee:

“Antisemitism, no matter in what form it would appear, might bring only an injury to our national interests. The shortcomings of the Polish commerce and industry can neither be removed by antisemitism nor by national demagogism; they could be removed only by wide reforms that would enable them to establish better hygiene of the inner social and economic relations in general; that would raise the standard of culture among the wide masses, and that would offer new openings for new fields in industry and for general development.

“Only frank and decided declaration that regenerated Poland would not maintain the policy of antisemitism, the policy of chicanery and persecution, might help to make Jews better citizens on one hand, and on the other hand it would check the wide anti-Polish crusade carried on now by Jews abroad. Leaving Russia and turning to Western Europe, Poland must follow the example given by the countries of Western Europe in solving the Jewish question, namely, Poland must gain sympathy of Jews by granting them equal rights of citizens. At the same time, we must emphatically demand of Jews that they become the true citizens of the country—that they act for the interest of the country, and work for her development. This end could be secured only by giving the Jews in Poland access to the sources of welfare and culture. As in Western Europe, Jews have become either good Frenchmen, Englishmen,

Italians or Germans, so we have the right, too, to demand of our Polish Jews to become good Poles and be real good citizens of Poland.”

Poland cannot and will not recognize any hyphenated Poles!

For the sake of historical accuracy, I take the liberty to assert that the attack of the Jewish press on Poland, not only here in America, but also all over the world, was made suddenly and without any endeavor on the part of the Jews to come to an understanding with the Polish Supreme National Committee regarding the policy of future Poland on the Jewish question. The enmity of the Jews against the Poles plainly manifested itself in this country of free speech and free press, by the failure to insert vindications of the Poles against a wave of calumnies thrown at the Polish nation, the first step being made by George Brandes, who wrote an open and most unjust letter. Jewish nationalists were very well aware of the fact that Poland, not being anti-semitic in general as a nation, must, however, be anti-zionistic when the zionism or Jewish nationalism endeavors with Russian or German aid to create the Judeo-Poland.

Those who think that the Jewish question in Poland means an antagonism against the Jews are grossly mistaken. It is something entirely different, inasmuch as the war made on the Polish nation by the Jewish nationalistic party all over the world tends to obtain for the Jews in Poland not the rights of equal citizenship, but a recognition of a distinct national franchise in order to make of Poland a country of mixed nationality and thus to create, with the help of Russia, a precedent for the revision of the entire Jewish question in Europe and possibly also in America in the near future. The following quotation may serve as an illustration: “In order that Jews may be assured of equality in civil and political



life it is essential that they be accorded recognition as a national group in Poland," and "it is hardly probable that any sensible Jew will object to the Jewish demand for equal recognition with the Ruthenians, the Czechs, the Slavs of the Austrian Empire."\*

The attitude of the whole world toward the Jewish question can be expressed by the formula of the French revolution: "The Jews as a nation should be deprived of everything, but the Jews as men should be assured of everything."† This is the principle of equal civic rights for Jews without granting them separate national rights. Contrary to this, the Jews demand in future Poland equal recognition for their jargon as a national tongue. Even Western Europe has not as yet grown up to the national concubinage, and Poland is still less ready to outdo the whole world in the Jewish question. Jewish nationalism does not lie within the practical political demands. *Natura non facit saltus*. The development of democracy in Europe must at first separate the idea of national consciousness from the idea of owning the soil. Only then will it be possible for a nation to exist within a nation. At present the whole world stands on the basis of the principle of the French revolution, and Poland, being in the throes of this terrible war, cannot indulge in risky experiments.

Russia understands that in case of her eventual victory over the Germans, there will come a time when the Germans will start the war of retaliation—no matter what key Russia is going to use in making the frontiers of the "United Poland." Both the ethnographical and the historical keys bring Russia closer to Berlin. The victory of Russia would not weaken Germany as much as it would weaken Prussia within the

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\* "Dos Yidische Folk," New York, November 12, 1915.

† Clermon Tonners, 21, 12, 1789, in the National Assembly.

German empire. Prussia cannot submit to this weakening for any length of time and she will not lack means and cleverness to draw the German empire into her plans of revenge. Russia must take into account that the German war of revenge in the east will have the support of England, since England is the enemy of German ambitions on the sea and in colonial enterprises, but she is not Germany's rival on land, and especially not in Eastern Europe. England, after having defeated Germany on the sea, and having ousted the Germans from Belgium, will gladly attack the victorious Russia with German hands on the first occasion, so as not to permit the excessive overgrowth of Russia. These are the factors which guide Russia's policy in Poland in the present war. Russia must, due to her aggressive traditions, gravitate toward the Oder, and the road to the Oder leads over the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains. This tendency is couched in Russian diplomatic language in the phrase—"Uniting Poland under the sceptre of the Czar." In reality it means the securing of her eventual western frontiers, in order to make the best use of her numerical superiority in the future inevitable retaliatory war with Germany and Austria. Politically the Russian plan tries to poison Poland with an excess of Germans and Jews, which process would facilitate the digestion of the occupied territories and absolute conquest of the Vistula.

The game has been going on for a year.

There was no greater strategical mistake on the part of Russia than her victory over Hindenburg at Warsaw. Hindenburg's offensive was merely a strategical provocation to draw the centrum of the Russian army to the left bank of the Vistula, and then to threaten with flank attacks both Russian wings, and not permitting any movement westward for fear of losing the lines of communication. The defence

of Warsaw was the beginning of the defeat of Russia on the Vistula. The paradox of the Vistula, Austria holding the upper course, Russia the middle, and Germany the lower, proved its inherent danger. The strategical road toward the west does not run through Warsaw so long as Cracow and Danzig do not belong to the aggressor. Dragomirow, Hurko and Kuropatkin were right in advising Russia to follow Kutuzow's plan which originated in his combat with Napoleon. With the Mazurian Lakes in the north and the Carpathian passes in the south, endangering both wings of the Russian army, Russia cannot attack successfully either Vienna or Berlin. The Russian offensive movement through Warsaw forces the Russian army to assume an arched position, with the center directed toward the west and both flanks running backwards, one along the Mazurian Lakes and the other along the Carpathian Mountains. Such a strategical position is synonymous with defeat. With Poland divided into three parts and the strategical difficulty of the Vistula created thereby, the only way for Russia to victory is to follow Kutuzow's method and retire beyond the Niemen and Bug rivers. Strategically it means the evacuation of Russian-Poland in the first period of the war. Politically it signifies the superfluity of Russian-Poland for Russia. The Russian rule over Poland has no political, no historical, no moral basis, not even a strategical one. For Poland it means injury, for Russia it means an unnecessary burden of false imperialism. History administered justice to Russia by her terrible defeat, and gave her warning for the future. Only an independent Poland can solve easily the strategical difficulty of the Vistula.

The independence of Poland has not only a historical foundation, but also a strategical one. The partition of Poland renders the Russian offensive westward impossible.

In the present condition of Poland, the road to Vienna or Berlin does not lead through Warsaw; on the contrary, Austria-Hungary and Germany dominate the Russian line of fortresses of Warsaw, Deblin\* and Modlin,† as long as they possess the Mazurian Lakes and the Carpathian Mountains, while the road toward the east is open for them. This is the fundamental contrast in the strategical interests of Germany and Austria on one side, and Russia on the other. This contrast can only be removed by the independence of Poland. Let us assume for the sake of argument that Poland will be restored after the present war. In the future war of retaliation, Poland by the power of her existence only will defend Russia against an out-flanking movement from the side of the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains. Poland remaining neutral, the territory about the middle of the Vistula cannot be made the field of military operations. It is hardly conceivable, however, that Poland could stay neutral in such a war. It will be the war for the possession of the Vistula line! If we assume that Poland would turn against Russia, then the line of conflict will be formed by the rivers Niemen, Bug and Dniester. In other words, Russia will be free from danger of flank attacks upon her wings and will have the possibility of the frontal attack in the westerly direction. In case Poland would turn against Germany and Austria-Hungary, Warsaw would be in danger of a flanking attack from the side of the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains, which fact equalizes in favor of Germany and Austria the numerical superiority of Russia. The new partition of Poland between Austria and Germany will deprive them of the possibility of the flanking movement, since it will not restore Poland but only remove Russia

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\* Ivangorod.

† Novo-Georgievsk.

from Warsaw. This will only be favorable for Russia, since it will facilitate her eventual frontal attack on the whole line, leaving her flanks secure in a good strategical position. Only the neutrality of independent Poland may be a factor for insuring a permanent peace, since it will render difficult the Russian offensive toward the west, as well as that of Austria and Germany toward the east. Besides this, a line of Polish fortresses on the Niemen, Bug and Dniester would also materially assist in guaranteeing peace.

There is a difference in power a free nation can display from that of an enslaved nation. The free and independent Poland will soon become the center of Slavic creative power in harmony with the interests of Western Europe, and without political Russophilism. Poland even now neutralizes the Russian influence in the Slavic world, since she is an older historical unit than Russia. The Balkan states are free, but their civilization is inferior to that of Russia and that is why the Balkans are such favorable soil for Russian political propaganda. The equilibrium of Europe can only be maintained by the division of the Slavic world. In Warsaw, the Roman cross and the traditions of Rome; in Moscow, and on the Dnieper, the cross and the traditions of Constantinople. This does not mean the separation of two religious systems only. Two different cultures, sympathies, arts, and finally, two different forms of political law should be separated from each other. Constantinople was the breeding place of the Cæsarian despotism; Rome, on the other side, due to the strife between the Papacy and the Roman emperors, was the source of the emancipation of states and nations and in the last instance of the citizen. All these factors constitute the boundary line between the civilization of Western Europe and that of Russia. Poland al-

ways was the vanguard of the west. Poland was the fatherland of Copernicus, "who stopped the sun in its course." The investigation of Birkenmajer in the archives of Stockholm settled finally the nationality of Copernicus in favor of Poland.\* The system of Copernicus forms the basis of the modern conception of the universe. If it had not been for Copernicus, Newton could not have accomplished his work or he would have to be Copernicus first. The physics of Gallileo is also the echo of the work of Copernicus. Poland had no freedom for the last hundred years. Oppression restrained the Polish schools and made it very difficult for the Polish nation to participate in the great work of civilization. Illiteracy and misery are set loose in Poland and have all the prospects of unlimited development which is denied to science and enterprise. Poland is not permitted to study and work. Such is the curse of life in slavery! The Polish creative genius could not, however, be suppressed. Chopin's music and Mickiewicz's poetry already after the downfall of Poland became the common spiritual good of the whole world. Sienkiewicz and Curie-Skłodowski won Nobel prizes. In the scientific circles of the world are known the names of Smoluchowski, Raciborski, Marchlewski, Godlewski, Morozewicz, Romer, Abramowski, Rozwadowski, Zaremba, Olszewski, Kostanecki, Ochorowicz, and numerous others. That is the achievement of a nation of 20,000,000 people and possessing but two universities, one in Cracow and one in Lemberg. As soon as the Russian army occupied Lemberg, one of the first steps taken was the closing of the Polish University. Warsaw, a Western European city in the real sense of the word, in tradition and culture, a city numbering about 1,000,000 inhabitants, the capital city of 20,000,000 people, having a glorious and great

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\* Expedition of Cracow's Academy of Sciences.

history, did not possess a university! This was a fact which humiliated western civilization, and for this civilization in general has to be thankful to Russia, which proclaimed in this way the "Slavic Brotherhood" on the Vistula. Liberty will stimulate the Polish genius and this will enrich the world with new elements, and the Polish nation will regain the power to "play the part in Europe to which it is entitled by its numbers, its culture, and its genius."\*

The Congress of Vienna recognized and based its work upon the principle of legitimism. It was the conservative idea contrary to all the achievements of the Napoleonic era. Legitimism did not recognize the will of the nation; it supported legitimate authority, especially monarchy, on the grounds of hereditary rights. Belgium was returned to the Netherlands, the principality of Warsaw was annihilated, and Italy redivided. This cast the seeds for the revolution in Belgium, and the still more sanguine uprising in Poland. Italy had to have her Garibaldi. May the future peace congress not repeat the mistakes of the Congress in Vienna! Russia still to-day does not recognize the rights of nations in practice, placing the race above the rights of a nation, a principle very much inferior to the principle of legitimism. To Poland Russia promises autonomy in internal administration. This is less than the Congress of Vienna did, and which transformed the principality of Warsaw into a state within a state and did not only make an autonomic province of it. Poland hopes that if ever a future congress should not make it a sovereign state, it will at least deal with her according to the Vienna treaties, and will not allow approaching the Polish problem on the basis of the manifesto of Duke Nikolas. The Congress of Vienna, although taking

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\* "The Manchester Guardian," 19, 12, 1915.—"The New Poland," by Bruce Boswell, of Liverpool University.

the principle of legitimism as the point of issue, granted Poland the character of a state within a state; a separate diet, an army, it obliged the Russian Czar to crown himself Polish King in Warsaw. Will the future congress, which will assemble under the banner of freedom for nations, have the courage to step below this principle when dealing with the Polish question?

The attitude of Poles as a nation devoid of political liberty was determined by real facts and not by sympathies:

- I.—Administrative and legislative autonomy existed in Galicia while Russian and German Poland did not enjoy these advantages.
- II.—Private military schools could only be established in Galicia. Consequently, Polish youths from Russian and Prussian-Poland went to Galicia since in the former two provinces any military work had to be secretly carried on, and, consequently, not very effectively. The beginning of this political system dates back to the years 1876-8, when with the unofficial aid of England an uprising against Russia, in alliance with Austro-Hungary, was organized.
- III.—Only in Russian-Poland, on the left bank of the Vistula, were there enough recruits for the Polish military representation in the case of European war, since Russia had, for strategical reasons, to evacuate the western governments of Russian Poland with the outbreak of the war, and this prevented the Russian authorities to mobilize in the mining and industrial districts of Russian-Poland.
- IV.—During the Congress of Vienna, one hundred years ago, England entered into a secret treaty



with France and Austria against Russia, in spite of the fact that Russia was a faithful ally of England in her war against Napoleon.

V.—At the Congress in Vienna, England supported the Polish interests against Russia, although the Polish regiments were fighting with Napoleon against England.

VI.—Poland wanted and could form a military representation only against Russia and in alliance with Austria-Hungary. That it was practicable was proven by the development of the Polish legions in Cracow and an absolute failure of Russian endeavors in Warsaw to form a competitory legion.

VII.—Russia occupies 80 per cent. of the historical Polish territory, and Warsaw is the capital city of Poland. Under these conditions the war of Austria with Prussia in 1866 could not, and did not revive the Polish question, but the possibility of war between Austria and Russia was always and must always be associated with the preparation of the Polish uprising against Russia and in alliance with Austria-Hungary.

VIII.—The military interests in the present war do not coincide with the political interests, consequently the formation of the Polish legions against Russia, and in alliance with Austria-Hungary, does not free any one from the obligation of supporting the Polish independence.

Poland went along the way of her *ratio status* and of practical possibilities. She could not forget for a moment that Warsaw is not Antwerp, and that Warsaw is not located in front of London on the other side of the Channel. England must fight in order to support Belgium, but England

may limit the support of the Polish question to the war on paper. The Polish uprising in 1830 broke out when Czar Nikolas I, in the name of the reactionary principle of legitimism, wanted to send the Polish army to Belgium in order to crush her struggle for independence. That did not influence England in the following year to save Warsaw from the Russian superior forces, although it was Warsaw which saved Belgium. The blood of the Polish heroes of the uprising of 1863 created nothing more than sympathy in Western Europe. The Congress of Vienna obliged not only Russia but also Prussia to respect the rights of the Polish nation. Prussia at the time of Bismarck adopted the anti-Polish policy in the Province of Posen. Bismarck did not like the sea, so England preferred to keep quiet and to forget diplomatically the treaty of Vienna. On November 9, 1896, a Prussian order was issued, changing the Polish flag of the Province of Posen and substituting it with the Prussian colors. On February 10, 1897, Minister Von der Recke made a brutal speech in the Prussian diet defending the above order. England remained silent; still worse, she preferred to terrorize France in her Fashoda dispute, instead of claiming of Berlin the observance of the treaties of Vienna concerning the Polish rights. England did not forget her treaties with Belgium, but alas, how soon she did forget those concerning the Polish cause. Nobody enters war for someone else's pleasure; nobody sheds the blood of his nation for the other people's interests only. Such is the logic and truth of history. Poland understands it, but she wants also other nations to understand her position. If those, who in the present war proclaimed the watchword of the independence of nations, are sincere, Poland hopes that the future peace congress will adopt one of two alternatives :

I.—Either absolute independence of Poland, or

II.—Restoration of Poland as a state within another state.

Both alternatives prohibit the submittance of Polish territory to another dismemberment.

The union of the Polish provinces under the sceptre of the Czar, and on the basis of the manifesto of the Grand Duke Nikolas, will be, in spite of all appearances, only an injustice to Poland. A Polish state within a federation of German states would be an anomaly. A Polish state in union with Austria-Hungary on the basis of a triple union would be a favorable solution of the problem. But happiness and full justice can only be brought about by absolute independence, since this form of political existence was lost by Poland due to the "crime" of the partition.\*

The hurricane of war which at present envelops Warsaw with the cloud of smoke rising from the battlefields, and with rivers of blood spilled in the greatest war of the ages will give birth to Poland's future. And above this blood-soaked soil of Poland the Polish legions unfurled their banner of Red and White, and await the help of all nations having the good will to help.

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\* Clemenceau.

